I just noticed on a new Linux system that we got at work that if you
try and change root's password as root, it does not ask you for root's
current password before allowing the new one to be entered.  I thought
this might be something with Linux until I realized that our Solaris
servers are the same way.  Is there a reason for this?  It seems
terribly unsecure.  Of course people should be either only logged in
as root when necessary or locking their workstations, but still.


-Ken

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Ken wrote:
> I just noticed on a new Linux system that we got at work that if you
> try and change root's password as root, it does not ask you for root's
> current password before allowing the new one to be entered.  I thought
> this might be something with Linux until I realized that our Solaris
> servers are the same way.  Is there a reason for this?  It seems
> terribly unsecure.  Of course people should be either only logged in
> as root when necessary or locking their workstations, but still.

As root is already all-powerful, it's difficult to prevent him from
making direct modifications on the password database (/etc/passwd,
/etc/shadow, or the more sophisticated password management systems like
PAM).

Basically, if you have gained root access, then there's no effective
block against root's updating the password, and thus it is redundant and
unnecessary to validate root's current password.


- --

Lew Pitcher, IT Consultant, Enterprise Data Systems
Enterprise Technology Solutions, TD Bank Financial Group

(Opinions expressed here are my own, not my employer's)
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On Wed, 27 Oct 2004 19:00:01 +0000 (UTC), Ken <nntp@hellrot.org> wrote:
> I just noticed on a new Linux system that we got at work that if you
> try and change root's password as root, it does not ask you for root's
> current password before allowing the new one to be entered.  I thought
> this might be something with Linux until I realized that our Solaris
> servers are the same way.  Is there a reason for this?  It seems
> terribly unsecure.  

I'm not sure how it would be insecure if, to be root, you need the password
already.

> Of course people should be either only logged in
> as root when necessary or locking their workstations, but still.

Think of the failure modes, though.  In order for this to be a problem,
a sysadmin would have to log in as root and walk away from an unsecured
screen.  If they do that, changing of root passwords is the _least_ of
their problems.

sudo is a good way to grant root access without giving out root passwords,
but that wasn't your question.

Dave Hinz